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Technology is transferred through various channels by
many different agents. The Korean electronics industry
has been heavily dependent upon licensing from foreign
firms. The level of technology in the Korean electronics
industry nearly matches that of developed countries in
terms of generalized products. However, Korea falls
behind in both basic engineering and in the production of
parts and materials as well as fundamental technologies
for designing and producing new products. The lesson is
that a nation must develop its own indigenous
technological capabilities in order to gain leverage in
much more advantageous technological transfer
arrangement.
1. Introduction
Technology is transferred through various channels and
by many different agents. Although various forms of
technology transfer are considered, licensing is discussed
more often than others. Since Korea's outward technology
is negligible, only inward technology is discussed. In
order to gain some insights, technology transfer in the
Korean electronics industry is examined.
Since a country's technology transfer is affected by the
overall industrial and technological policy of the country
and by R&D efforts of firms. Although Korea has been
fairly successful in its economic  growth, its technology
policy and performance have not always been as
successful. Despite its remarkable achievement in building
up its technological capability, there remain many areas
which have been neglected and many problems to be
solved.
Section 2  discusses the forms and channels of
technology transfer. In the section 3 , I will remark on the
importance of technology transfer in the context of
product cycle  theory. Section 4  discusses the case of
the Korean electronics industry. Section 5  conclude.1060-3425/98 $10.2. Forms & Channels of Technology Transfer
As shown in Table 1, we may consider several forms
and channels of international technology transfer.
Technology can be transferred between two
countries(bilaterally) or among many countries, through
international institutions (multilaterally). It can take the
form of commercial or non-commercial transactions in
public or private sectors. Major channels and means of
technology transfer include licensing, FDI, trade of capital
goods, and strategic alliances.  Technology transfer may
take the form of intra-firm transfer, inter-firm transfer or
inter-government transfer.
Firms in Korea acquire foreign technologies mainly
through licensing, and role of FDI is limited. Table 2 is
one survey result which confirms this characteristic of the
various channels of technology transfer; licensing
accounted for 31.8%, the highest, whereas FDI accounted
for only 6.5% in 1991. Many other surveys report similar
observations that the role of FDI in technology transfer to
Korea has been negligible. This phenomenon is a result of
the strong orientation of Korean entrepreneurs and
government toward independent operation of business,
which is in turn deeply rooted in the personality of the
Korean people.
3. Is Technology Transfer to the South
   Detrimental to the Interest of the North?
Technology transfer is an important means by which
regional economies can achieve the transition to activities
relying more on advanced technologies and skilled labor.
Technology innovation in the Northern developed
countries and the transfer of technology to LDCs play an
important role in shaping the pattern of world trade and its
changes. Among the extensive verbal and empirical
literature on this topic, Vernon's[13] concept of the
"product cycle" stands out as the stylized description of
the processes of international flows of technology. In the
Vernon's 1966 paper[13],00 (c) 1998 IEEE
"Development and initial manufacturing of new
products takes place in the North, because R&D
capabilities are well developed there and because
proximity to large, high-income markets facilitates the
innovation process. Then, technology transfer orTable 1. Forms of Technology Transfer
        Forms      Objectives      Characteristics Remarks
  Intra-Firm
-Protection of technology
-Strengthening
 subsidiary’s
 competitiveness
-Monopolistic ownership of
 technology by parent company
-Risk of weakening monopoly
 power of parent company
FDI
Internal
transaction
Market
Type
-Royalty earnings
-Direct technology transfer
-Technology markets
-Licensing
Commercial
transaction
Non-
Market
Type
-Utilization of externalities -Low degree of transfer effects
-Technology transfer by
 contracts
Non-
commercial
transaction
Private
Sector Inter-
Firm
Alliance
-Utilization of
 complementary assets
-Cross-licensing, collaborative
 R&D, co-ownership of
 technologies
-OEM, exchange of
 complementary assets and
 function by joint venture, etc
Quasi-
commercial
transaction
  Inter-Government
-Technology Assistance
-Collaborative technology
 development and
 utilization
-Political objectives
-Common use of public welfare-
 oriented technologies
-Human resource development
Non-
commercial
transaction
Source : Yoo Soo Hong, Japan's Strategy for Technology Transfer to Asia and Korea's Response, 1993, p.22.imitation by Southern firms takes place, whereupon the
bulk of production migrates to the South to capitalize
on the relatively cheap labor there. Inter-regional trade
in manufactured goods involves exchange of the latest,
more established goods, produced predominantly or
entirely in the South."
The formal modeling of the product cycle was
pioneered by Krugman[10] and his work has been
extended by Dollar[1], as well as Jensen and Thursby[7].
Recently, Grossman-Helpman[2,4] built a general model
of international trade and economic growth encompassing
scale economies, different stages of production of R&D,
intermediates, final goods, and multi-periods. The benefits
of rapid technology transfer are supported by Grossman
and Helpman[3].
In studies of technology-driven growth, Grossman and
Helpman[3] found that "the size of the resource base and
the productivity of resources in the learning activities are
important determinants of steady-state growth rate.
Steady-state growth is faster, the larger is the resource
base of the South, and the more productive are its
resources in learning the production processes for1060-3425/98 $10.00products originally developed in the North. This is
surprising since faster imitation by the South means on
average a shorter period over which a Northern
entrepreneur can earn monopoly profits. But profits
during the monopoly phase are higher when a smallernumber of Northern producers compete for resources in
the manufacturing sector. The latter effect dominates so
faster imitation by the South ultimately strengthens the
incentive to innovate in the North."
In comparing the product-cycle equilibrium to one with
autarchy in each region, international trade always leads
to faster growth in the North in the long run. The
migration of some production to the South frees resources
for use in the product development sector in the North. In
the steady-state equilibrium with trade, the Northern firms
have greater incentive to undertake R&D than in autarchy,
because each earns a higher profit rate, albeit during a
shorter period of time. The South, too, grows faster with
trade than without.
Turning to the "boomerang effect", a term coined by
Japanese Professor Miyohei Shinohara[12] in 1976. The
phenomenon originally referred to the "imports in
reverse" into Japan that follow the overseas expansion of
Japanese enterprises and the subsequent need to make
adjustments in the domestic industry. It has been applied
more broadly to the case of technology that intensifies the
competition in domestic and third-country markets.
Japanese businessmen often talked about the negative (c) 1998 IEEE
Table 2. Main Channels for Foreign Technology Acquisition
   unit: %
Licen-
sing
Sending
Engineers
Abroad
Techno
-logy
Train-
ing
Information
Associated
Capital
Imports
Foreign
Direct
Investm
ent
Informa-
tion from
Suppliers
Recruit of
Overseas
Scientists
Others
Electronics
Electricity
Machinery
Chemicals
Textiles
Metals
Ceramics
Shipbuilding
Pharmaceuticals
Foods
 88
 90
 86
 90
 91
 80
 94
 90
 22
 80
   66
   71
   66
   49
   50
   61
   69
   74
   50
   50
  57
  54
  61
  53
  63
  57
  50
  74
  46
  67
   32
   24
   27
   35
   31
   54
   42
   16
   68
   40
  15
  20
  18
  29
  11
  20
  22
   5
   5
   7
   11
   15
   11
   10
   12
   15
    8
   11
    9
   10
   7
   2
   2
   1
   3
   0
   3
   0
   9
   3
   0
  10
   5
   3
   0
   0
   0
  14
   0
   0
Average  88    62   58    34   18    11    3    3
Composition 31.8   22.4  20.9   12.3   6.5    4.0   1.1   1.1
Note : Up to three choices were allowed. Composition is the percentage of each average to the total of average
Source : Korea Development Bank, Effect Analysis of Technology Imports, 1991.Adapted.effects of technology transfers from Japan to Korea. One
of their favorite examples is the success of Pohang Iron
and Steel Company (POSCO).
In the early 1970s, South Korea planned to build a
large integrated steelmill whose construction was first
offered to a consortium of Western steelmakers. That
arrangement went unsettled due to an unwillingness to
provided sufficient credit. Then Japanese steel firms
stepped and began supplying plant and equipment on
good credit terms. Now the deal has come back to haunt
them: POSCO is one of the most efficient steel firms in
the world and finally in a position to meet most of Korea's
domestic demands, while Japanese steel exports are being
cut back correspondingly. Japanese firms also face
growing competition in third markets, especially in the
United States and Southeast Asia. Japan has begun to
import Korean steel. POSCO now produce high-quality
steel and sells it on the world markets, as can be seen in
Table 3 at very competition prices.
Table 3.  Comparison of 1988 Steel Prices
   Steel Products  ($ per ton)
Country Hot Coil Plate Cold Rolled
Coil
Korea   320  326     451
Taiwan   385  385     473
United States   638  688     765
Japan   435  491     621
Source: Steers et al.(1989)1060-3425/98 $10.0Japanese companies also opened textile factories in many
developing countries which were designed basically for
domestic purposes in late 1960's and 1970's. Later, under
pressure, they also set up synthetic fiber plants and , to
obtain economies of scale, made them considerably large.
Now, many of these countries can supply their own goods
which have replaced Japanese products. For some time
already, they have successfully invaded the international
markets, challenging the Japanese in low-price, high
quality articles.
To take another example, a similar progression took
place with Samsung Electronics Company (SEC), the
largest electronics firm in Korea. Much of the firm's
original equipment was supplied by Japanese companies;
the result has been the rise of the Korean electronics
industry have nearly driven their Japanese counterparts
out of the market for simple items like radios, cassette
recorders and black-and-white televisions and are
challenging the market for color televisions and video
cassette recorders (VCRs).
The above example vividly illustrate the "boomerang
effect". Japan ships plants and equipment abroad, which
in time produce goods to replace its own exports. Then, as
capacity expands and sophistication rises, these
companies begin competing against Japanese products in
third-country markets and even, then, are coming back
and haunting Japan.
This has been one of the hot issues between Japan and
Asian NICs, especially in Korea. When firms want
advanced technology transfers, Japanese businessmen and
government bureaucrats have often been reluctant to0 (c) 1998 IEEE
provide their blueprints worrying about the possible
boomerang effects against them. They argue that if a
domestic firm licenses their knowhow to a foreign firm,
the foreign license will expand its production, eventually
exporting to the Japanese market and increasing
competition with the original licensor. It is true that the
expansion of Korean exports have decreased Japan's
market share in the iron and steel, radio and textile
industries. We cannot, however, predict adverse effects in
other Japanese industries in general. As Table 4 shows,
the import penetration of Asian NICs, especially Korea, to
Japan has remained steady since the mid-1970s.
Table 4.  Japan: Import Penetration
by Asian NICs for Total Manufacturing
                 Import Penetration Ratio
  1970   1974   1979   1985
 Asian NICs   0.24   0.69   0.82   0.75
 Korea   0.08   0.31   0.33   0.30
Source: OECD (1988)
Some Korean economist and businessmen often
counter that Korea's trade deficit with Japan actually
worsening year by year, while her trade surplus with the
U.S. is widening to the point of a U.S. threat of trade war.
If we take k(=export-import/export+import) as an
indicator of trade imbalance between two countries, as
shown by Table 5, Korea's trade deficit with JapanTable 5.  Trade Balance Among U.S., Japan and Korea
                                A's exports to B/A's imports from B
   A      B      1982    1985     1988
   U.S. - Japan     24,185/36,546     26,009/66,684     42,267/90,245
   Japan-Korea      4,869/3,270      7,156/4,144     15,442/11,827
   U.S.-Korea      5,529/6,011      5,956/10713     11,290/21,209worsened (from k=-0.197 in 1982 to k = -0.267 in 1985),
whereas Korea's trade surplus with the U.S. soared
sharply (from k=0.042 in 1982 to k=0.306 in 1988). This
being the case, it may be that Japan is in effect indirectly
exporting to the U.S. by exporting intermediate goods to
Korea. From the perspective of an entire industrial
structure, production expansion in the Korean downstream
market could stimulate exports of Japanese intermediate
and capital goods to the technology importer. This
upstream expansion partially or overly offsets the profit
loss in Japan's final goods industry. So it can be said that
Korea might suffer from counter-boomerang effects if her
exports to Japan and third country markets were less than
her imports of intermediate and capital goods from Japan,
that is, net gains in the technology-exporting country1060-3425/98 $10.0could go in either direction a priori.
4. The Case of the Korean Electronics
   Industry
4.1. A Brief History of the Industry
It is of much interest to review the development of the
Korean electronics industry in order to better understand
the pattern and role of technology transfer due to the
following reasons. First, the electronics industry is the
leading manufacturing sector in Korea, and it imported
more foreign technologies than any other sector. Second,
the industry demonstrates well the main features of
technology in Korea, both strengths and shortfalls.
Most firms in the industry in the 1960s were either
manufacturers of simple home electronics such as radio
and black-and white TV sets or OEM suppliers for foreign
firms. The growth and success of the industry, an obvious
late-comer, during the past three decades is remarkable.
Between 1985 and 1993, the Korean electronics industry
grew at an average rate 23.2 percent per year as shown in
Table 6. Consumer electronics is the major subsector of
the electronics industry. The industry has displayed
remarkable progress in terms of both product quality and
diversification. During its early stages in the 1960s and
1970s, the Korean consumer electronics industry
focused mainly on assembling foreign parts, usually for
radios and black-and white TV sets. During the 1980s,however, the Korean consumer electronics industry has
diversified its technological capabilities to such products
as color TV sets, microwave ovens, compact disk players,
camcorders and digital audio tapes. The industry has
shifted from consumer-oriented production to industrial
production with technology-intensive processes. Today,
Korea is the third largest producer and exporter in the
world of world consumer electronics. In 1970, Korea sold
merely $55 million worth of electronics to the world
market. By 1993, that figure has skyrocketed to $22.2
billion, over 6 percent of the world market. Despite
growing trade restriction by the U.S. and other developed
countries, personal computers and VCRs made in Korea
now occupy an impressive share of their respective
markets all around the globe, with exports representing0 (c) 1998 IEEE
Table 6. Status of the Electronics Industry in Korea
Unit:  Million $, %
 1970  1980  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993
Annual
Growth
 Rate
Production
GNP(A)
Electronics (B)
Consumer El. (C)
  B/A
  C/A
  C/B
 8,800
106
  -
1. 2
 -
 -
60,500
 1,179
 1,145
5. 3
6. 4
 46.4
83,100
 8,460
 3,586
 10.2
  4.3
 46.4
242,300
 29,711
 10,261
12.3
 4.2
34.5
281,700
 33,104
 11,504
  11.7
   3.9
  33.4
294,500
 33,407
 10,545
  11.3
   3.6
  31.6
328,700
 36,465
 11,198
  11.1
   3.4
  30.7
 18.8
 23.2
 15.3
-
-
Exports
Total Exports (D)
Electronics (E)
Consumer El. (F)
  E/D
  F/D
  F/E
 835
  55
  -
 6.6
  -
-
17,505
 2,055
 1,036
 11.7
  5.9
 50.4
30,283
 4,532
 1,839
 15.0
  6.1
 40.6
 64,016
 17,215
  5,529
  26.5
   8.5
  32.1
 71,870
 19,334
  6,054
  26.9
   8.4
  31.3
 76,632
 20,683
5,966
  27.0
   7.8
  28.8
 82,236
 22,226
6,253
  27.0
   7.6
  28.1
 13.3
 22.0
 16.5
   -
   -
1) Since GNP is value added and electronics is sales, the ratios in the table should be carefully interpreted.
2) Amounts and growth are based on current prices.
Sources : Bank of Korea, Electronic Industries Association of Korea.more than three-quarters of total production.
4.2. Foreign Investment
It goes without saying that foreign capital and
technology have played an important role in the
development of Korea's industries. More than most of
Korea's other developing industries, the consumer
electronics industry has relied quite substantially of
foreign investment, typically in the form of OEM
agreements. Korea possessed very little indigenous
technology in the area of consumer electronics during its
early stages. At the same time, however, its workers
provided a reliable and cheap source of labor for foreign
(usually American and later Japanese) companies.
Under its export-led growth strategy, Korean electronicsmanufacturers had no choice but to heavily depend on
OEM agreements to provide both technology and access
to overseas markets. With a limited technology base,1060-3425/98 $10.negligible brand recognition overseas, and no
international marketing presence, there were few
alternatives for the industry.
Although many of these early agreements initially did
not provide much opportunity for the  transfer of
electronics technology to Korea, a very limited amount of
technical know-how was gained and diffused through the
Korean electronics industry. The contribution of foreign
firms to the production and exports of the Korean
electronics industry has declined over time, although they
still maintain significant shares in electronics production
and exports as shown in Table 7. Firms with foreign
capital produced 15.9 percent of total domestics consumer
electronics production and exported 25.5 percent of all
Korean electronics exported in 1982. However, their
shares in 1990 were 6.0 percent and 9.2 percent,    
      Table 7. Share of Production and Export of Consumer Electronics
    by Type of Company in Korea
       1982        1985        1990
 Production  Export  Production  Export  Production  Export
 Local firms    84.1   74.5     88.9   83.2    94.0   90.8
 Joint Venture     4.9    6.1      5.4    7.7     4.8    6.0
 Foreign Firms    11.0   19.4      5.7    9.1     1.2    3.2
    Source: Electronic Industries Association of Korearespectively. The production share of local firms
increased from 74.5 percent to 90.8 percent during the
same period.00 (c) 1998 IEEE
The Korean electronics industry has been heavily
dependent upon licensing from foreign firms. One
constructive case study can be seen in the licensing
agreements between Phillips and several Korean
companies to manufacture compact disk players. Since
Korean electronics corporations possessed most of the
technical background to produce such products, and since
Phillips, itself, was a major producer of compact disk
player deck mechanisms, Phillips licensed the remaining
technology to ten Korean corporations for unrestricted
production of compact disk players. Likewise, when
Hitachi wished to shift its own focus from 1M DRAM
microprocessors to 4M DRAM microprocessors, it
licensed the technology and provided technical assistance
to Goldstar to produce 1M DRAM microprocessors. This
allowed such corporations to improve the technological
base even further. Such technological transfers have
proved to be mutually beneficial for both Korean
companies and for Phillips and Hitachi, respectively. The
semiconductor industry, a subsector of the industrial
electronics industry, is the most successful within the
Korean manufacturing sector. It began assembling
discrete devices in the 1960s. Having taken over many
foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures, local
semiconductor producers heavily invested in DRAM
facilities to meet growing domestic and foreign demand
during the 1980s.  Semiconductors are now Korea's
largest single export item. Korea accounted for 35 percent
of world 4M DRAM production in 1993, and is expected
to account for 40 - 50 percent of world 16M DRAMTable 8.  Korean DRAM Technology Gap
 64K DRAM  256K DRAM  1M DRAM  4M DRAM  16M DRAM  64M DRAM
 Developed
 Country
  1979   1982    1985   late 1987  early 1990   late 1992
 Korea   1983   1984    1986   early 1988   mid 1990   late 1992
 GAP   4 years   2 years   1 years   6 months   3 months    same
Source: The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energyproduction in 1994.
The Industry's technology level for discrete level and
memory devices has nearly reached the same level as
advanced countries. Table 8 shows the breath-taking
development of Korean DRAM technology over the past
10 years. This vividly demonstrates the possibility for a
developing country to catch up with advanced countries in
the technology race, if the country satisfies certain
conditions.
4.3.  Strategic Alliances
Most Korean electronics manufactures established1060-3425/98 $10.0strategic alliances with major manufacturers in developed
countries, in particular the U.S. and Japan. Strategic aim
to utilize partners' complementary assets, resources, and
market in order to enhance comparative advantages.
Among the many forms, strategic technological alliances
are most prevailing. The semiconductor industry in the
most active subsector in the Korean electronics industry
for strategic alliances. The technological capability of the
sector is demonstrated by the fact that Samsung, Gold Star,
and Hyundai set up 16M DRAM production system in
1993, and that Samsung developed 256M Dram chip
technology in 1994. Table 9 (Table 10) summarizes major
strategic alliances between Korean and U.S. (Japanese)
semiconductor producers. All forms of strategic alliances
such as technology transfers, OEM, joint ventures, joint
R&D, second sourcing, etc. have been established.
As shown in Table 11, strategic alliances in the
electronics and communications sector are characterized
by the involvement of large firms. This is a common
feature in Korea, where big conglomerates are the
industrial leaders.  Since more than 90 percent of
strategic technological alliances are formed between and
among large firms in developed countries, the
opportunities for Korean firms to exploit this new strategy
may be limited. However, the number of strategic
technological alliances is expected to continue to increase
in the future due to the following reason. First, the ever
shortening technology life cycle and the increasing risks
and costs of R&D encourage strategic technological
alliances. Foreign firms can utilize the technology drive ofthe Korean government and R&D investments of
conglomerates in Korea. Second, firms in developed
countries sometimes want to establish strategic alliances
with firms in countries such as Korea, Singapore, Taiwan,
etc. in order to utilize specific local merits or to use them
as complementary alliances. Third, Korea can be utilized
as a foothold for expanding business to the rest of Asia,
and Korea's market itself is attractive to foreign firms.
4.4.  Technological Level of the Korean
    Electronics Industry
At least until the mid-1980s, low labor costs and0 (c) 1998 IEEE
         Table 9. Korean-U.S. Semiconductor Technology Alliances
 Korean Firms  U.S. Firms  Memory  Non-Memory     Others
 Sam Sung
 Micron
 Intel
 TI
 HP
 IBM
 AT&T
 HMS
 AMT, Varian
 T,E
 T,M
 T,E
 M
 M,T
 T
 T,S
 T,R
 T
 JV in Portugal
 Assumption of new device
   business
 Joint development of
   8" equipment
 Gold Star
 AT&T
 AMD
 Motorola
 Zilog
 T,E
 T
 M
 S
 Hyundai
 TI
 Intel
 GI
 T,M
 M
 M
 Daewoo  Zilog    T,E
 Anam
 TI
 AMD
 Motorola
 M(Assembly)  Merging a Phillipino
   factory Licensing
Note: T= Technology Transfer, M=OEM, E= Joint Venture, R= Joint Development
Source: Samsung Electronicsfavorable foreign exchange rates made local consumer
electronics very price-competitive on the international
markets, even though they were made with foreign key
parts and based on foreign technologies.
But, comparative labor cost advantages have eroded
recently. Therefore, the development of technology is the
most crucial issue for the Korean electronics industry, and
the key to future success lies in extensive research and
development.
Table 10. Korean-Japanese Semiconductor
Technology Alliances
 Korean
 Firms
 Japan
 Firms
Memory  Non-
 Memory
 Others
  
 Samsung
 Toshiba
 Sharp
 NTT
 Fujitsu
 Oki
 DNS
 R,T
  T
  T
  T
  T
E(Facility)
 Gold Star  Hitachi  T,M
  
 Hyundai
 Sharp
 Ricoh
 Fujitsu
 TI Japan
 T
 M
 M
 M
Note: T=Technology Transfer, M=OEM, E=Joint
Venture, R=Joint Development
Source: Samsung Electronics1060-3425/98 $10.0Table 11.  Strategic Alliances in Electronics
        and Telecommunications Industries
    Korean Firm  Counterpart
  
 VAN
 SamSung
 Hyundai
 PosData
 Ssangyong
 Samsung
 Dacom
 GoldStar
 IBM
 AT&T
 Compurserve,
 Sprint, etc
 Telenet
 NEC
 Infonet
 EDS
 Telecom
 System
 DaeWoo
 Kolon Data
 GoldStar
 Samsung
 ORELCO
 Hyundai
 Northern
   Telecom
 AT&T
 NEC
 Rolm
 Ericson
 Fujitsu
  
 Computers
 Samsung, Gold Star,
 Hyundai, DaeWoo,
 Trigem
 Samsung
 Daewoo
 Sun
 (Licensing)
 HP
 MIDS
Source: Complied from company data
The level of technology in the Korean electronics
industry nearly matches that of developed countries in
terms of generalized products. However, Korea falls0 (c) 1998 IEEE
behind in both basic engineering and in the production of
parts and materials. Fundamental technologies for
designing and producing new products are also inferior to
those in developed countries.
As of 1991, Korean video and audio equipment
producers lagged behind their counterparts in advanced
countries by a span of  2 - 4 years in the development of
new product; however, this gap widens to 5 - 7 years for
the development of high-tech products for the next
generation. Table 12 shows the technology gap in this
area between Korea and Japan.Table 12. Comparison of Product Development Year between Korea and Japan
                                                        Unit: year
       Existing Product       Next Generation Product
 Color
 TV
 VTR  Cam-
 corder
 Super
 TV
 1M
 DRAM
 HDTV  D-VTR     CD
 Application
 64M
 DRAM
 Korea
 Japan
 1974
 1960
 1980
 1975
 1987
 1984
 1987
 1982
 1986
 1983
 1993
 1984
 1996
 1989
   1996
   1989
  1992
  1992
 GAP    14     5     3     5     3     9     7       7      0
Source: Ministry of Trade and IndustrySince the 1980s, Korea video and audio manufacturers
relied on receiving up 80 percent of their technology from
foreign sources, especially from the United States and
Japan. As a result, localization of parts and components is
still extremely low considering that Korea is on the verge
of joining the ranks of the advanced countries in the
immediate future. Against these drawbacks, Korean
electronics producers are striving to realize technological
self-reliance in order to enhance their international
competitiveness. Korea has still a long way to go to
achieve self-reliance in the area of electronics technology.
However, one cannot deny that it has already made
remarkable progress in the indigenization of foreign
technologies.
5.  Conclusion
The economies of the Asia-Pacific are relying more
and more on private initiative and competitive markets, as
opposed to state intervention, for their economic growth
and development. The shift in development strategy is
based on the view that economic growth as well as equity
can be enhanced by promoting the development of private
enterprises. The positive correlation between private
sector development and economic growth has received a
great deal of attention in recent years. The Asia-Pacific
region can be characterized as having adopted a policy
approach that embraces two essential elements of
promoting private sector development-trade liberalization
and deregulation.
Trade liberalization is a very effective way to1060-3425/98 $10implement competitive markets and private initiatives.
Liberalization aims to promote an outward-looking
development strategy, emphasizing the leading role of
industry and making trade as means to raise efficiency and
productivity through competition, economies of scale,
new technology and improved organization skills and
management. An example of liberalization is the recent
freeing of imports in Korea. To promote internalization of
the domestic market, the Korean government raised its
import liberalization rate to 97.3 percent and has planned
to lower the basic tariff rate from 12.7 percent to 7.9.0percent by 1993.
Although Korea has been fairly successful in its
technological development, some problems or drawbacks
should be pointed out for it future.  First, the most
serious problem faced by Korea is the structural
imbalance between large firms and small firms. It is an
irony that Korea can produce world-class semiconductors
while it suffers from high rates of defects in the
production of rather matured technologies. This is mainly
due to the underdevelopment of small and medium-sized
firms and the insufficient technological capability of these
firms. Without a sound basis for fundamental technologies
of small firms, further development of the Korean industry
will be hampered.
Second, although Korea has achieved remarkable
progress in some high technologies and has mastered
mature manufacturing technologies, it lacks self-
sufficiency on core technologies for essential parts and
sophisticated industrial equipment. Also, Korea lacks the
design capability for many sophisticated products. Heavy
dependence on foreign technologies for core parts causes
two problems: worsening terms of trade of these
technologies against Korea due to the expansion of
technology protectionism by advanced countries, and
crowding out of domestic R&D efforts.
Third, despite a great amount of R&D investments,
R&D productivity is low in general, and dissemination
and spill-over effects are very limited. Thus, a more
efficient national R&D system is an urgent necessity in
order to maximize the effects of R&D.
A difficult decision for a developing country to make is0 (c) 1998 IEEE
whether to follow a longer but more sound path like the
Japanese model, or to follow a faster but much riskier path
like the Korean model as we have reviewed so far, in
order to successfully catch-up with developed countries in
the area of technology.
A slower path implies support for and development of
small and medium-sized firms to build a sound foundation
of fundamental technologies, which will in turn contribute
to the building up of indigenous technological capability
in key industrial sectors. This analogous to Aesop's fable
of "The Hare and the Tortoise". In the long run, this
slower path strategy may turn out to be better. However,
in my opinion, an increasing number of late-comers will
choose a path similar to that of Korea as technological
cycles become shorter and shorter and R&D costs
skyrocket.
The experience of Korea renders, first and foremost,
the lesson that a nation must develop its own indigenous
technological capabilities in order to gain leverage in
much more advantageous technological transfer
arrangement. Second, the government must play an active
role in building science and technological infrastructure.
However, technological innovation should be initiated by
the private sector, fully utilizing the infrastructure
provided by the government.
Finally, a well-educated work force and a relatively
stable political climate are needed for the development of
such an indigenous technological infrastructure.
As for Korea, its future is quite uncertain.  The
country has yet to attain cutting-edge status in core
technologies in major field.  Nevertheless, if the past is
any indication of the future, Korea has the potential to
catch up with advanced countries at least in some niche
areas. Accurately predicting the future is impossible.
However, the experience of Korean government and
private sectors can offer hopes to the developing countries
working very hard to develop key technology-based
industries by developing an indigenous technological
infrastructure.1060-3425/98 $10.0References
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